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Summary findings
Using a tax model of an open economy, Devarajan, Go,  For imports to grow and tariff collection to
and Li provide a simple but rigorous method for  compensate for the tax cut, the import elasticity has to
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domestic goods, so they provide empirical estimates of  well.
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They also discuss the implications of their analysis for  domestic goods increase, a tariff reform can theoretically
public revenue.  be self-financing. But if the elasticities are less than
In general, they find that it matters what the values of  "large," tax revenue will fall with tariff reduction and
the two elasticities are relative to each other. If only one  further fiscal adjustments will be necessary.
of the elasticities is low (close to zero), revenue will drop  Devarajan, Go, and Li provide empirical estimates of
unequivocally as a result of tariff reform, reaching close  the possible range of values for the elasticities of about
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Despite compelling  evidence  of its many benefits,  trade liberalization remains an
unfinished business in many parts of the world, particularly Sub-Saharan Africa.
One reason is that many developing  countries  today are still dependent on import
tariffs for revenue. Governments  fear trade reform will lead to significant  revenue
losses  in the short run.  In Sub-Saharan Africa  trade taxes account for 27 percent
of total revenue of governments. 1 For some countries-C6te  d'Ivoire, The Gam-
bia, Madagascar, Mali, Mauritius,  Niger, Sao Tome  and Principe, and Swaziland,
for example-the  dependence on trade taxes is higher than 40 percent.
A number of authors (Branson et al.  (1992), Mitra (1992), and Greenaway
and  Milner (1991)) have therefore emphasized the importance of concomitant
fiscal adjustment to make trade reform sustainable. But what should the size of
the fiscal adjustment be? What determines the magnitude of the fiscal impact?
How can it be minimized?  Will the liberalization  ever be self-financing?  Answers
to these questions  typically require an elaborate tax model with its healthy, not
to say rude, appetite for data. As a result, policymakers  rarely have the answers
when they need them.  Trade reform is then either not undertaken, or done so
with little knowledge  of its fiscal consequences.
'Excluding  South Africa and Nigeria; based on recent data  (1992) from the World Bank's
African Development Indicators 1996.
1The purpose of this paper is to present the simplest structure of an open econ-
omy that provides  a quick but clear method of quantifying  the fiscal  consequences
of trade reform. The model can be solved analytically and we provide intuitive
formulae for understanding the fiscal effects of tariff changes. In addition, we
provide  empirical estimates of the model's  key parameters for about 60 countries.
The fiscal impact of a tariff reduction will depend directly on the size of the
tariff cut, the response  of imports to the tax change,  and the relative  importance of
import tariffs as a source  of government  revenue. It will also depend indirectly on
what happens to the other tax bases and how they in turn will affect  revenue. The
key to revenue  performance,  therefore, is how  all the tax bases will  change with the
reform. To estimate the direct and indirect fiscal consequences,  economists  have
often employed general-equilibrium  tax models. These tax models can be quite
complicated and difficult to build, particularly in view of the data constraints
in many developing  countries. Their complexity also makes it hard to sort out
the relative importance of various factors. 2 To seek an easier but still rigorous
alternative, to better  understand how tax  models work, and to  identify what
affects public revenue,  this paper takes a simple analytic representation of a large
class of empirical general-equilibrium  models, a prototypical framework  that has
2A recent,  extensive  discussion  of the structure of applied  general  equilibrium  models  may
be found in Ginsburg  and Keyzer  (1997). Past surveys  are also found in Robinson  (1989)  or
Shoven  and Whalley  (1984).
2been shown  in Devarajan et al. (1993,  1997)  to anticipate many of the significant
results of trade-focused general-equilibrium  models.  In this  paper, we extend
the framework  to analyze taxes and their fiscal and welfare impact. The goal is
not to capture the detailed economic and tax structure of a particular country,
nor to arrive at  precise estimates of the direct and indirect fiscal and welfare
consequences  of trade reform,  but rather to isolate key parameters and ascertain
their empirical magnitudes, and to provide a quick but clear way to quantify the
fiscal consequences. 3
The rest of the paper is divided into three sections. Section 2 discusses  the
specifications  of the simple open2-economy  framework  and its applications  towards
macro-fiscal  policy. Key analytical results are derived. Section 3 provides esti-
mates of these parameters for different countries and describe estimation issues
and problems. A summary of conclusions  follows  in Section 4.
3This framework can be numerically implemented using widely available data from national
and fiscal accounts and in a user-friendly spreadsheet format (Devarajan, Go, Lewis, Robinson,
and Sinko (1997)). It has also been adapted to look at the fiscal impact of a regional custom
union, see Devarajan, Go, Suthiwart-Narueput, and Voss (1997), as well as the dynamic impact
of trade and macro policy, see Devarajan and Go (1998).
32.  The  model
2.1. The  1-2-3 model  with taxation
Total public revenue, R, is defined  as the sum of revenue intakes R, from various
taxes. Consider  the two  most important taxes in developing  countries-an  import
tariff tm  and a  domestic indirect tax.  The latter may be a  tax on  domestic
spending, tq, which applies equally to the domestic goods and imports; or,  it
may be a tax on production of domestic goods, td,  but not on the production of
exports, in which case exports serve as an untaxed sector. That is,
R =ERi  = tm e 7rmM  + tqPqQ  + tdPdD  (2.1)
where irm is the world price, and M the quantity of imports; e  is the foreign
exchange rate;  Pq is the price of domestic demand Q; and Pd is the producer
price of domestic goods D.
The model in which the tax instruments are considered  is a simple general
equilibrium model that has one country, two activities, and three goods, or "1-2-
3 model" (Devarajan et al.  (1993, 1997)). The basic nature of the 1-2-3  model
is a modified Salter-Swan  methodology that  separates the economy into three
distinct goods: exports E, imports M, and a 'domestic' or nontraded goods D.
The production of exports and domestic goods is defined by a transformation
4process marked  by a constant  elasticity  of transformation  Q,
X  a (AL" + (1 - A)D-?)  t  (2.2)
where  Q =  -i-  is the  elasticity  of transformation  and  a  is  a shift  parameter.
Output  X  is exogenous and  constant  given fixed factor endowment.  From profit-
maximizing  behavior,  the  relative  amount  of exports  and  domestic  goods  pro-
duced is determined  by their  relative prices and  Q:
E  (PE)  (2.3)
D  Pf,
where k is a constant equal to  (19A)n ; PD is the tax-adjusted producer price
PD(1 + td);  given  the  world  price of exports  7rE,  pE  =  7E  e  is their  domestic
price.
Consumers'  demand is satisfied by imports  and domestic goods and  is defined
by a constant  elasticity  of substitution  (CES) utility  over the  two goods
Q =  e (6M-P  + (1 - 6)D-P)  P  (2.4)
where a  =  is the elasticity of substitution  and e is a CES shift parameter.  The
proportion  of imports  and  domestic  goods consumed is affected by their  relative
5prices and  a  from the  following first-order  condition:
D  (PM)  (2.5)
where k'  is a constant.  To buy Q, consumers receive income from pro-
duction  plus a lump-sum  transfer  from  government,  i.e., their  budget  constraint
is
PQ(1  + tq)Q = PxX  + R  (2.6)
The expenditure  tax  tq that  is imposed on Q applies  equally to M  and  D.
We assume  the economy is in trade  balance so that:
tlM  - 7teE  = O  (2.7)
In addition,  there  are  two price identities:
PX  peE+PdD  (2.8)
M  1D
PQ  Pm.  Q  +P  (2.9)
A  few remarks  are  in order.  The  model implies  imperfect  substitution  be-
6tween domestic and foreign goods.  Even if the 'law of one price' prevails and
perfect substitution is found amDng  specific commodities,  the elasticities of the
aggregated goods will still be less  than infinity whenever  aggregation  requires dif-
ferent weights because of preferences, endowment,  and trade specialization. 4 In
more practical terms, the CET and CES formulations allow one to avoid corner
solutions or complete specialization. Because  they are well-defined  and intuitive
to use, the two functions are popular and serve as key relationships in more dis-
aggregated models as well. 5 In both the aggregated and disaggregated cases, it
is obvious that the elasticities of the CES and CET functions will play key roles
in the numerical outcomes of the models.
The model requires a price numeraire and the  foreign exchange rate  e  is
used.  There are eight variables (R, E, M, D, Q, Fd,  FiX, FQ) in nine equations.
But by Walras' law, one of the equation is redundant so that  one equation may
be dropped.
4Devarajan (1997) discusses the problem of defining tradable and non-tradable goods in the
context of determining the real exchange rate misalignment in the CFA zone.
5With more disaggregation, domestic and foreign goods may be indexed over groups of com-
modities, i.e., Ei, Mi, Di,where i =food, various manufactures etc. For each class of commodities,
Qi, Xi are then  defined by their respective CES and CET functions.  Cobb-Douglas, a special
case, is sometimes used.
In the  supply side, note  that  wi1h fixed factors, the  single output  X  is also fixed.  With
disaggregation, resource reallocation from relative price shocks and interindustry purchases come
into  play; a production  function fcr each category of output  and the specification of factor
markets are necessary.
72.2.  Consequences  of a tariff reform
To derive  the fiscal  and welfare  effects  of a tariff reform, we first log-differentiate
the system of equations (1)-(7), noting that  (except for tm) the growth rates of
other exogenous  variables (X, e, rm,  nre,  td,  tq) are zeroes:6
R=6m(tmn  + M) + OR  (p,  + Q) + +OdR P+D)(.0 -?  =  R  d+f)(2.10)
where OR = R  iS the relative weight of the tax revenue  from source i and, hence,
E  =  1. Even in this simple set-up, it is clear that the fiscal impact of a tariff
reduction depends not only on im, M, and kRn,  but also on D, Q, Pd,  P, and the
revenue  weights of domestic taxes Of"'s.
The growth  rate of X (= 0) and Q are expressed  as 'weighted'  averages  of the
growth  rates of foreign  and domestic  goods:
Ox=  E +  oxD  (2.11)
Q=  oM  + oD  (2.12)
where  the various  weights  are defined  by the relative  importance  of foreign  and
domestic  goods  and the CET and CES  parameters:
6That  ,  a  a  =
8SX  =  AS(E  )7
OQ=  be(M)p
02=  (1  - b)C-P  (D)P
Equation 2.12 is also the change in utility or welfare. The first-order conditions
in turn are:
E -D  b  - =  Jd  (2.13)
M-D  = a (Pd-WtJ.m)  (2.14)
In equation 2.14, wt,  - is the price wedge  created by t,
The budget constraint yields
Pq + Q  (1 - OR)Pz  +  6R  (2.15)
where O{ is the relative weiglat  of the lump-sum  tax transfer in household  income.
9The trade balance equation implies
M=E  (2.16)
Finally,
P  x  =pXt  +  (1  - PX)(d  +  )  (2.17)
where  Px  =  -PxI'E  exports' share in GDP.
2.2.1.  Impact  on Pd, D, M,  and E
An important factor in the revenue  impact is the change in the price of domestic
good Pd, the key endogenous  price of the model. Given that world prices are ex-
ogenous,  Pd determines the change  in the real exchange  rate, which in turn affect
the allocation of the three goods in the model M, E,and D through the optimal
conditions, 2.3 and 2.5. Through its effects  on Pg and P:,  Pd also influences  the
behavior of the domestic tax bases Q and X. A specific  expression  for Pd can be
derived (from equations 2.13, 2.14, and 2.16):7
A 7For  an expression  of Pd in  terms  of possible  terms-of-trade  shocks  and  their  implications,
see Devarajan  et.  al.  (1993).
10Pd =  +  itm  (2.18)
All parameters  in the  coefficieni- °  are positive so that  Pd varies directly with
as expected;  a rise  (reduction)  in tariff protection  will raise (lower) the  price
of the  import  substitute.
A precise  expression  for exports  can  also be  obtained  (from 2.11,  2.13, and
2.18):
E =-  i  '1:  t^m  (2.19)
1+ /02
where P  I  and /d2 =  E  8 Both  01 and  P2 are  positive  so that  im,  working
like an  export  tax,  affects  D  negatively as expected.
FRom  the  current  account  balance  (2.16), the  change in imports  is the  same
as that  of exports,  i.e., M = E:. Solving for D, we note  that  the  added protection
afforded by a positive tm will encourage the production  of domestic or 'non-traded'
goods:
8From equation 2.11, define 02 =  O  . Using the usual budget equations for a CET function
or the first-condition 2.3 to remove A from the O's, it can be shown that  62 =  . Finally,
initializing prices to 1 in the base year, 12 =  D
1131I02- b  =  +2  t+  (2.20)
Because  of its  modified  Salter-Swan  formulation,  the  behavior  of  the  1-2-3
model  is shown to be  consistent  with  traditional  trade  theory.  In addition,  the
impact  on E, M, D,  and  Pd, depend  on values of the  trade  elasticities  a  and  Q,
the  size of the  tax  wedge wt.,  and  the  relative  importance  of trade  02.  How the
parameters  affect revenue and welfare are  examined next.
2.3.  Revenue  impact
2.3.1.  Case  1:  tm is the  only  tax
Take the  simplest  case  in which  there  are  no  domestic  taxes,  so  that  tq  =  0,
td  =0,  O,  =0,  O,  o  =0,  and  OR =  1. From  2.10, it is clear  that  revenue  will
depend  on whether  imports  expand  sufficiently to offset the cut  in tariffs:
f? = tm + M
Substituting  the  previous  solution  for M,  we find that
1=  ki,m
12where
r1  (u  +2  )(1  + 32)
Can k, be negative? In other words, can there be a Laffer  curve for tariffs?
k1 is negative if
O*Wtm~i  > 
(a + Q!)(1  + 02)
an  (1>  +2)  (2.21)
a +Q  wt,
For non zero exports (f 2 -D  > 0) and positive tariffs (0 < wtm < 1), note that D
(1+12) > 1. Hence,  the left-hand side,  +Q,  has to be sufficiently  greater than 1,
a condition that  may be satisfied  if both a  and Q are high.
How high should the elasticities be?  Take some feasible numerical values,
=2  2  and  wLm  = 0.2  (i.e., t,,  =  0.25), Figure  2.1 shows the  revenue impact  for
a 50 percent  reduction  in tarilfs  for different values of a  and  Q.
A  few observations  can be  made.  Even if just  one of the  elasticities  is low
(close to zero), revenue will decline unequivocally, reaching close to the maximum
drop  regardless  whether  the  other elasticity  is high.  This is because  for imports
to  grow and  tariff  collection  to  compensate  for the  tax  cut,  or has  to  be  high.
Because  of the  balance  of trade  constraint  however, imports  cannot  substitute
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Figure  2.1: tm is the  only tax
has  to  be high  as well.  In  the  example  given, both  a  and  Q have to be  greater
than  20 before  revenue growth  becomes  really  positive.  Hence  as  substitution
possibilities  between foreign and domestic  goods increase, a tariff reform  may be
self-financing.  Conversely, if the  elasticities  are less than  'large',  tax  revenue will
fall with tariff reduction  and further  fiscal adjustments  are necessary.  The precise
value of a  or Q is of course an  empirical issue, which we will examine  in section
3.  Note  further  that  the  higher is the  initial  tariff  (higher wtm) the  more  likely
will the  tariff reduction  be self-financing.
142.3,2.  Case 2:  There is also a domestic expenditure  tax tq
What would happen to revenue if there were a domestic tax?  Take the case in
which the only domestic tax is an expenditure tax on Q, so that  td =,  OR = O
and
R  R (tm"  + M3)  + (1 _ OR)  (  )(.2 R=O  7n  m  +  ~~~~~~~~~(2.22)
There are two possible opposing effects on the domestic tax base - Pq will fall
while Q may rise because  of the cheaper imports. To investigate  their net effects,
note that  (Pq  + Q)  is an average of P.  and R in 2.15, and an expression  for P,
is available  in 2.17. Using the previous solutions  for Pd, D, M and E, which are
unaffected by the introduction of tq,  we are also able to derive R in terms of the
policy change tm:
f  =  k2tm and kz = Xi  (2.23)
X2
where
OR.1  =  P,  (t-awt,sQa+  rSt'.  (  ntg), Xi  a  j+~Ytn&+7t  T  I)/2)
+ 1  (awt  (1  + 2 (  +  Q) W  2 (1  0E)  B26E)
15and
X2  =  (1qOR9Y)  (a  +  Q  +Wtm  a  + Q  ) X2  q Rk  \o+W)  /32)
The denominator  of the coefficient  k2 is always  positive, i.e., X2 > 0. The numer-
ator X1  is generally  positive  unless a and Q are sufficiently  high so that  (-uWtmtQ)
in the first part of the expression  dominates.
Substituting the same values  of the parameters in Case I and further assuming
that tariff revenue  is now one third of total revenue,  OR = 0.33 and that the tax
rebate is 20 percent of income, OR =  0.33.  Figure 2.2 shows that  the revenue
profile is the sanie as Case 1. Note that for low  elasticities,  the revenue decline  is
less than Case 1 since tariff revenue  is now less important. In this case however,
both elasticities now have to be a lot greater than 40 before the revenue impact
is positive. The reason is that,  although with a higher elasticity, the greater is
the increase  in M, the response  of D goes in the opposite direction, rendering the
effect on Q relatively neutral.  Thus, policy reform generally  has a negative net
effect on the domestic tax base and consequently,  imports have to expand a lot
more to raise revenue. Nevertheless,  like Case 1, a tariff reform can still finance
itself with sufficiently  high elasticities.
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Figure 2.3: A tax on D but E untaxed
where
k3 =  (  1 +  [(1(-IO)OWtm +  2  (a  + Q  Wt-mWe  + (0  +rn 2)]
Here the  result is more direct.  If O6; <  0.5, that  is, tariff revenue does not
dominate total revenue, k3 is always positive, regardless of the values of a  and
Q. FRom  equation 2.24 Pd and D, and thus revenue from the domestic tax base,
will tend to fall as both ao  and Ql  rise. Retaining the parameter values in Case
2, we confirm this in Figure 2.3. Hence, unlike Case 1 and 2, public revenue  will
always  fall and it will decrease more the higher the elasticities.
182.4. Welfare impact
Using  equations 2.19, 2.20, and 2.16 in the equation for Q (2.12), the growth rate
in utility is derived as follows:9:
Q  k4m  (2.26)
where
k4  (a  +  Q)(1  +2)  (  02a-  )
a,,tn3fl  is always positive. Using the familiar budget shares equations for a
CES equation and initializing  lprices  to one, it can be shown  that O  Q  (  )  (P..)M  e
(Q)  e  Likewise,  OQ  = (i)  so that welfare  increases if
2  <2)  (D)(
(1)"  (E)  D'
9Q,&  Re  may be interpretedi as a negative equivalent variation -EV  as a ratio to GNP,
since EV =  Po(Qo - Q), Po = 1 and Qo is base-year GNP.
19The  intuition  behind  2.27 is simple.  If the  curvature1 o of  the  isoquant  is suf-
ficiently  'flat',  a  condition  that  is easily  attainable  if the  armington  function  is
elastic  (a  >  1), and  if M  > E  (for example,  when the  current  account  is bal-
anced),  k4 will be  negative and  a tariff cut  will lead to a welfare gain.11
Using the  parameter  values from the  previous cases, we show that  the welfare
gain increases with the  elasticities  in Figure  2.4.
3.  Empirical  estimates  of elasticities
3.1.  Econometric  issues
As the previous  section indicates,  to be able to determine  the  direction and  quan-
tify the size of the  fiscal impact  of trade  reform, we need estimates  of the  foreign
trade  elasticities  . Although  there is large  literature  on trade  elasticities,  the es-
timation  of trade  elasticities  generally  applies  to import  demand.  Exports  from
developing  countries  are  modeled  as  import  demand  from  importing  industrial
° 0More precisely,  the curvature  of the CES  function  is
aM  _(  -_6)_
AD  6  (V
"1For any given set of elasticities, it is not clear whether Q  >,e  >  C-2  >  Qcase. In case
2, Q is initially  less than optimal  because  of the tax tg so that increases  in Q from a tariff cut
might be higher;  but this may  be offset  by a smaller  income  effect  because  of tax diversification.
In case  3, a taxed D implies  that it is underproduced.  Shifting  away  from  it towards  the untaxed
exports may not enhance  welfare  as much in a second-best  sense. But equation  2.26  indicates
that k4 may or may not be higher.  Whatever  the case,  it is safe to say that Q will  at least be
higher  for  plausible  values  of the parameters.
200.06< 
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Figure  2.4: Welfare impact  of tariff reform
countries.  Furthermore,  in estimating  import  demand,  while the  imperfect  sub-
stitution  model of Armington  J1969) is the most prevalent  specification, estimates
of elasticities  are  usually in thLe  form of demand  price elasticities,  not  directly in
terms  of the substitution  and transformation  elasticities that  appear in our model.
A  key  issue  in  the  empirical  investigations  is whether  changes  in  the  real
exchange  rate  have  a  significant  impact  on  the  balance  of  trade.  The  litera-
ture  may  be  divided  along  how they  answer  the  question.  Most  of the  earlier
literature,  such as Branson  (1.972) and  Khan  (1974),12 as well as others  like Rit-
tenberg  (1986), and  Bond(1987),  and  Marquez  and  McNeilly  (1988) found  that
1
2A  survey  can  be found  in  Goldstein  and  Khan  (1985).
21trade  flows respond significantly  to changes in relative prices.  However, they
are today criticized for inference  problems associated with time-series variables
that  have unit roots.  Some recent empirical work that  took into account the
time-series properties of trade flows and prices, such as Rose (1990 and  1991)
and Ostry and Rose (1992), found little evidence that relative prices matter in
trade flows. The lack of theory in time-series techniques can of course create
interpretation problems. Marquez (1994), for example, stressed the importance
of optimizing  behavior and simultaneity in determining the expenditures on do-
mestic and foreign  goods. For developing  countries, Faini, Pritchett,  and Clavijo
(1988) discussed  the importance of trade policy and restrictions, which are likely
to understate the structural demand elasticities. One study by Reinhart (1995)
uses time-series techniques and dynamic optimizing  behavior; it finds significant
trade relationships but that the aggregate price elasticities tend to be lower than
unity.
There are differences  in findings  at the disaggregated levels  as well. Brenton
and Winters (1992) avoid assuming  separability between home and foreign goods
and find low import price elasticities. Panagariya, Shah, and Mishra (1996), on
the other hand, employing  better data such as explicit competitors' prices (not
proxies) find high elasticities.  In any case, these elasticities apply to  specific
groups of commodities,  i.e., not at the level of aggregation  desired in our model.
22Another  issue is the  assumpl,ion of homotheticity  in the  Armington  function,
which is violated  by the time trends  observed in trade shares.  Import  and export
shares in GDP for many countries  appear to be increasing and independent  of the
relative  price movements.  Alstcn  et al.  (1990), for example, note  that  while the
implicit  assumption  of homotheticity  in the  CES and  CET  formulations  is theo-
retically  appealing,  it is also highly restrictive  in CGE modeling.  The standard
correction is usually to employ a scale variable, such as an income term,  to denote
aggregate income activity.  Alternative  formulations  like the almost ideal  demand
system (AIDS) or one of the flexible functional forms are often suggested.13 Using
AIDS, Hanson,  Robinson, and  'rokarick  (1993) find the sectoral  expenditure  elas-
ticities  in United  States  are generally greater  than  one.  Other  AIDS estimations
are  found  in  Alston  and  Green  (1990) and  Shiells,  Roland-Holst,  and  Reinert
(1993).
While  it is certainly  plausible  that  the  capacity  to import  among  countries
rises  with  income,  Petri  (1984) and  Ho  and  Jorgenson  (1997) believe that  the
high  income  elasticities  estimated  are  probably  spurious.  In  fact,  trade  shares
seem to be  increasing  over time  for rich and  poor  countries  alike,  as would  be
the  case with  increasing  globalization.  A natural  breakpoint  is the  1970s when
13Another  possibility  is to use the CES  version  suggested  by Brown  and de Cani (1963),  which
permits a variable  degree  of homogeneity  while  retaining  a constant  elasticity  of substitution.
23wide-ranging  changes in the international monetary and trading system were im-
plemented. Even for large industrial countries like the United States, there is a
sharp acceleration in the import share in the 1970s. For developing  and transi-
tional economies,  periods of rapid economic  and trade liberalization (particularly
in the late 1980s)  are crucial factors. Compared to the earlier periods of inward-
orientation, changes in trade policy  in the latter periods often lead to structural
breaks in the trade shares. To account for the shifts in trade shares, a time trend
or a function like the logistic curve is recommended.
There are very few studies that investigate  export supply explicitly. Diewert
and Morrison (1988)  employ  a production-based  approach originally  developed  in
Kohli (1978)  to obtain export supply and import demand. A recent cross-country
estimation of export demand and price elasticities that account for nonstationar-
ity is by Senhadji and Montegro (1998). Faini (1994)  is one study that estimates
transformation elasticities from a CET function directly and that takes into ac-
count adjustment lags, factor prices, and the importance of capacity utilization.
He finds that the CET elasticity  to be less  than one for Morroco  but much greater
than one for Turkey.  In general, it would  be difficult to replicate these studies for
many countries without extensive  micro  data. Part of the problem  is the measure-
ment problems of factor accumulations  and their returns.  Another issue is the
adjustment lags in supply that may require measurement  of capacity utilization.
243.2. Estimation  methods  anad  results
In this paper, we employ a variety  of methods to estimate our critical parameters,
or and P. Tables 1 and 2 tabulate the Armington and CET elasticities estimated
using these various  methods. No single  method provides  uniformly  good estimates
for all countries in the sample. In the tables, we provide  only those estimates that
have positive (or correct) sign  s and significant coefficients.  Between  the two elas-
ticities, CET elasticities tended to be estimated more frequently with the wrong
sign or insignificant  coefficients.  One problem is that the aggregate price indices
of imports, exports, and domestic good tend to move in the same fashion for
many countries, dominated by underlying  inflation trends and nominal exchange
rate depreciation. As a result, the real exchange  rates or relative prices of exports
and imports over the domestic good may be indistinguishable  from one another
statistically. The quantities of exports and imports also tended to move together
in many countries, especially  during periods with balance-of-payment  problems;
hence, the two functions may not be fully unidentified  in many instances. In ad-
dition, the CET elasticities miay  be affected  by possible  adjustment lags in supply
behavior  that are difficult  to handle without additional micro data. Nevertheless,
there are sufficiently  good estimates for both elasticities  in the tables. In the next
subsections,  we briefly describe the econometric  methods employed.
253.2.1.  Simple  OLS  results
Before  considering  other  approaches,  we estimate  using  OLS the  two aggregate
trade  elasticities  from the optimal conditions for import  demand and  export  sup-
ply  (equation  2.3  and  2.5).  By  taking  logarithms,  the  non-linear  functions  are
transformed  into log-linear form, from  which the  trade  elasticities  are  easily re-
covered:
In(D  pan(m  (3.1)
In (E)  =a  + Q  ln (pde)  (3.2)
where a  =  ln(  In  )t)  and  or=  ln ( i4 -)) are two constant  terms.  In general,
the  simple OLS estimation  of the  CET  elasticities  is the  most  problematic  with
the  largest number  of incorrect  signs and  insignificant coefficients.
3.2.2.  Time  trend,  structural  breaks,  and  scale  factor
To account  for the  changing ratios  of foreign over domestic goods, we add  a time
trend  to the  OLS. We also test  the hypothesis  that  there  is a structural  break  or
a non-linear  acceleration  in the  time  trend  due to policy reform, policy reversal,
or increasing  globalization.  In general,  it will be difficult to decide  on a specific
26break  point unless the timing of trade  reform is known for specific countries.  The
following specification  is used  to test  for possible structural  changes
InK(D  =  +t 7rit+  72I(k)t  +  In  (p +J  v
In  (E)  = a -t  6t  + 62I(k)t  + Qln  (p)  +  u
where I(k)  is an  indicator  function  which  equals  I  for t  > k  and  otherwise  0.
The  break  point  k is set to  d'fferent  values,  i.e., every five years.  This  specifi-
cation  is also extended  to test  for structural  breaks  in the  elasticities  as  well as
combinations  of a  structural  break  in  the  mean  and  a  structural  break  in  the
slope  coefficients (trend  or elasticities).  The logistic  trend  employed by Ho and
Jorgenson  (1998) is another  alternative  but we believe it is probably  better  suited
for industrial  countries,  where there is less chance of reversals of trend  directions
due to policy failures and  reversals.
For comparison,  we also eEtimate the equations  employing aggregate income as
a scale variable.  We employ the  log of domestic  GDP in the  Armington  function
and  the log of OECD  GDP index in the  CET function.  The two income variables,
which increase gradually, generally function  and serve as time trends.  Time trends
27seem to work best in improving  the CET estimates.
3.2.3.  Primary  products
Given the plausible hypothesis that  primary exports are not very responsive to
relative  prices in developing countries,  the export  data  are adjusted  to  eliminate
primary  product  export.  Define  PM  =  real  primary  product  export.  Then
E*  = E - PM.  We replace E  with E*  where applicable.  In general,  this  seems
to improve  the elasticities for a few  countries.
3.2.4.  Seemingly  unrelated  regressions
Another method we  used is that of seemingly  unrelated regressions  (SUR).  SUR is
designed to improve the  efficiency in the  variance estimation  in cases when there
is a correlation  between  the two sets of residuals.  The parameter  estimation  may
change,  however,  but  not  to  a great  extent.  In our  case,  the  signs most  of the
coefficients remain  the same.  Using subsamples  after  1980 on the hypothesis  that
foreign trade is more responsive  to prices during the widespread liberalization in
eighties seems  to lead to more positive CET estimates than using  the full samples.
However, the number of observations becomes very small and the estimates  should
be taken  with great  caution.
283.2.5.  Other factors
We also examine the premise that  a country's resource balance in the balance
of payment account or the relat'ive importance of the agriculture sector may af-
fect export and import behavior  by adding them as separate variables,  with and
without trend. A few of the estimation improve.
3.2.6.  Simultaneity
We also tried a number of approaches  that did not give good  results. Among  them
was simultaneous  estimation of the export function  and the import function using
instrumental variables methods. We also tried using a reduced form equation for
Pd  from which the trade elasticities can be derived:
ln(Pd) = c + oe  ln(P m ) +  lIn(PX) +  ±ln(A)  + u
where a  =  ,  =  ,  M/3 and 7  =  1.  However,  the coefficients  are over-
identified because we have three equations for two unknowns. Note that  if we
consider a + p  1 we can fuither write the above regression as
In  (  =In  (  +  ln()  + u.
29Based  on the  and  estimated  from  the  restricted  regression,  the  elasticities  Q =
p -1  and C  =  +  1 can be uniquely determined.  The results were not promising
however.
3.2.7.  Cointegration
We  also tried  unit  root  test  and  cointegration  regressions.  We  tried  different
model specifications,  including different lags, different orders of time polynomial,
etc.  The general  conclusion is that  the  unit root  null cannot  be rejected  for most
of the  variables  (each country  has  four time  series, i.e., In (E),  In (  I),  ln (D)
and  ln (PEM,)).  It should be noted however that  proper cointegration  analysis will
require  a  deeper  data  analysis  that  is only possible  with  thorough  examination
of individual  countries.  Moreover, the  absence of long time-series  may  increase
the  probability  of spurious  cointegration.  On  the  other  hand,  because  we are
using  annual  data,  longer time-series  runs  into the problem  of structural  change
or breaks  that  are harder  to handle in this  methodology.1 4 Keeping in mind the
caveats,  the cointegration  results  are also presented.
For the  cointegration  results of regressions 3.1 and 3.2, we tried  the  Johansen
vector error-correction  model (VECM) model (Johansen,  1988, 1991), the Phillips
and Hansen fully-modified  (FM) OLS model (Phillips and Hansen,  1990), and the
4See,  for  example,  Gonzalo  and Lee (1998),  for a discussion  of some  of the pitfalls.
30Park canonical cointegrating  regressions(CCR)  model  (Park, 1992). However,  not
all results are consistent or improve  with cointegration. Only the Johansen VECM
estimation results are reported.
4.  Conclusions
In this paper, we  present the simplest  structure of an open economy  that provides
a quick but clear method of quantifying  the fiscal consequences  of trade reform.
The model can be solved analytically and we provide intuitive formulae for un-
derstanding the fiscal effects  of tariff changes. We find in general that it matters
what the values of the elasticites, a  and Q, are relative to one another. Even if
just one of the elasticities is low  (close  to zero), revenue  will decline  unequivocally
from tariff reform, reaching close to the maximum drop regardless whether the
other elasticity is high. This is because for imports to grow and tariff collection
to compensate for the tax cut, the import elasticity a has to be high. Because
of the balance of trade constraint however,  imports cannot substitute for domes-
tic  goods unless supply is able to switch towards exports.  Hence, the  export
transformation elasticity Q has to be high as well. In the example given, both a
and Q have to be greater than 20 before revenue  growth becomes  really positive.
Hence as substitution possibilities  between foreign and domestic goods increase,
a tariff reform can theoretically be self-financing. Conversely,  if the elasticities
31are less than 'large', tax revenue will fall with tariff reduction and further fiscal
adjustments are necessary.
The precise value of a  or Q is an empirical issue and we provide empirical
estimates of the possible range for about 60 countries using various approaches,
including the Johansen method.  These estimates can of course be refined with
better  data (e.g. export price indices) and better  knowledge  of the breakpoints
and episodes of policy reforms and crisis.  However, they do indicate that  the
elasticites only range from 0 to 3 in most cases, nowhere  near the point at which
tariff reform can be self-financing.
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385. Appendices
We  compile  time-series  data of trade for selected  countries  from various  sources:
the World  Bank's  Economic  and Social  Database,  the IMF's  International  Finan-
cial Statistics  (IFS), as well  as trade taxes from  the IMF's Governmuent  Finance
Statistics (GFS).  Each variable  in the model  may be calibrated  using  different
data sources  and definitions.  AiFter  considering  various  alternatives,  we settle on
the most widely  available  nationaal  and fiscal  accounts,  which  give  us the longest
time-series: 15
* X =  total output of goocds  and services or GDP at factor cost in constant
local currency (base year 1987)
- E  =  exports of goods and  services in constant local currency from the
national accounts (base year 1987)
* M =  imports of goods and services in constant local currency from the
national accounts (base year 1987)
*  tm =  import duty defined  as the ratio of tariff revenue  to imports
* te =  export duty (-export subsidy) defined as the ratio of export duty to
exports
15Table 1 in the appendix summaries the list of variables we have tried and their alternative
sources.
39*  P  = price index of aggregate output or GDP at factor cost
*  PE  = price index of exports (fob) from national accounts  in local currency
plus export duty rate
*  PM = price index of imports (cif) from national accounts  in local currency
plus import tariff rate
*  D=X-E.
*  Pd  =  PXX-P,PE
* Q =  D + M,  total supply of goods and services, which should be equal to
C + I + G, i.e., aggregate domestic demand in constant local currency in
the national accounts
p  _  P,D+PE
Note the exchange rate is not incorporated into the formula if all variables
are based on the local currency.' 6 Due to missing observations,  we consider only
16For some countries such as Hong Kong and Singapore the domestic good price is not easy to
define. Because of significant re-exports, the value of trade is greater than  GDP (or aggregate
output).  Instead we can define Q = composite goods and Pq =  price of composite goods such
that  pq  =  P-X  - (PE  - PM)
Q
Q = X-(E-M).
40countries which  long time series in In (D)  In (-d), In (M) and In (pm)  required
for our estimation. Over long period of time, we also noted that the trends of the
price indices dominate the effects  of the trade taxes on the relative prices. These
trends are driven by significant long-term inflation in the domestic and world
markets as well as devaluations of foreign  exchange  rate. In order to maintain a
longer time-series in PM  and 
2 E, we decided to exclude the trade taxes, which
are available  only from the mid-seventies  at the earliest (from the IMF GFS).
This does not seem to affect  the estimates of the elasticities when we tested most
of the countries.
41Table I  Import Elasticities
Elasticity  Break  MODEL
Country  °  t(e)  Dummy  SUM  Year  NOB  Meftod  Order
ANGOLA  0.47  1.42  *  6  clsw/GOP
ARGENTINA  0.79  3.71  10  ols  w/o  trend
AUSTRIA  1.92  10.53  30  ols  wlo  trend
1.76  3.06  30  Johansen  VECM,  NDT  3
BAHAMAS;  THE  1.50  1.91  *  8  olsawl  GDP
1.44  3.62  8  SURw/trend,from  1980
BANGLADESH  0.57  2.31  22  ols  w/o  trend
0.55  2.83  22  ols  wl trend
0.54  2.98  22  ols  wl  GDP
0.37  2.18  22  SUR  wi  GDP,  all  available  years
0.35  1.99  22  SUR  w/  trend,  all  available  years
BELGIUM  0.61  1.79  34  ols  w/o  trend
0.26  6.66  34  ols  wl  trend
0.26  6.67  70  34  ols  wl  trend  break
0.26  3.09  34  ols  wl  GDP
0.27  3.27  34  SUR  w/  GDP,  all  available  years
0.24  6.41  34  SUR  w/  trend,  all available  years
BELIZE  0.66  2.04  *  15  olsawI  GOP
0.81  3.20  ^  15  SURw/trend,from  1980
BENIN  1.45  10.19  25  ols  w/o  trend
1.36  4.94  25  ols  wl  trend
1.41  5.56  25  ols  w/ GOP
1.17  5.46  25  SUR  w/  GDP,  all  available  years
1.18  4.71  25  SUR  w/  trend,  all available  years
2.50  13.84  25  Johansen  VECM,  LDT  4
BURUNDI  0.89  2.73  23  ols  w/  trend
0.68  1.80  23  ols  w/  GDP
0.65  1.74  23  SUR  wl  GDP,  all  available  years
0.87  2.68  23  SUR  w/  trend,  all  available  years
CAMEROON  0.22  2.83  22  ols  w/o  trend
0.22  2.45  22  ols  w/  trend
0.23  2.67  22  ols  w/  GDP
0.24  2.83  22  SUR  w/  GDP,  all  available  years
0.33  3.21  *  11  SUR  w/  GDP,  from  1980
0.24  2.59  22  SUR  wl  trend,  all  available  years
0.52  3.43  *  11  SUR  w/  trend,  from  1980
CANADA  2.01  8.69  29  ols  w/o  trend
2.29  4.05  29  Johansen  VECM,  NDT  5
CHAD  0.75  3.90  *  14  ols  wl GDP
0.91  4.67  ^  14  SUR  wl  trend,  all  available  years
CHILE  0.43  6.45  35  ols  wl  trend
0.43  6.31  80  35  ols  w/  trend  break
0.23  2.58  35  ols  w/  GOP
0.25  2.74  35  SUR  w/ GDP,  all available  years
0.51  8.12  35  SUR  wl  trend,  all available  years
0.15  1.34  35  Johansen  VECM,  LOT  3
CHINA  0.06  0.35  *  15  ols  wl GDP
0.06  0.47 * x  15  ols WI (X-M)IGDP  wI  trend
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0.06  0.60 *  x  15  olswl  AgrlGDPwlo trend
0.07  0.40 * x  15  SUR  w/ GDP,  from 1980
COLOMBIA  1.20  5.81  27  ols w/o  trend
1.13  5.35  27  olsw/trend
1.14  5.39  27  ols w/ GDP
1.30  6.97  27  SUR  w/ GDP,  all available  years
1.31  6.98  27  SUR  w/ trend,  all available  years
5.18  3.29  27  Johansen  VECM,  QDT  6
CONGO  0.36  2.11  30  olsw/otrend
0.37  2.12  30  ols  wl trend
0.36  3.14  85  30  ols wl trend break
0.38  2.11  30  olsw/GDP
0.36  2.15  30  SUR  wl GDP,  all available  years
0.34  2.08  30  SUR  w/ trend,  all available  years
0.25  1.27  x  30  Johansen  VECM,  NDT  4
COSTA  RICA  0.87  4.65  35  ols w/o  trend
0.56  5.42  35  ols w/ trend
0.54  6.04  75  35  ols w/ trend  break
0.56  6.19  35  ols wl GDP
0.59  7.35i  35  SUR  w/ GDP,  all available  years
0.62  6.97  35  SUR  w/ trend,  all available  years
CYPRUS  0.82  5.34  20  ols w/o  trend
1.08  4.24  20  ols  wl  (X-M)IGDP  w/o  trend
DENMARK  0.78  8.03  34  ols w/o  trend
0.86  4.15  34  Johansen  VECM,  NDT  3
DOMINICAN  REPUBLIC  0.23  2.58  32  ols w/o trend
0.27  2.80  32  ols wl trend
0.36  4.C5  85  32  ols w/ trend  break
0.26  2.62  32  ols wl GDP
0.41  4.80  32  SUR  wl GDP,  all available  years
0.41  4.87  32  SUR  wI trend,  all available  years
ECUADOR  0.27  1.!6  30  Johansen  VECM,  LDT  7
EGYPT  0.10  0.139  * x  13  ols wlo trend
FINLAND  0.47  2.29  34  ols w/o  trend
0.44  2.21  34  ols w/ (X-M)/GDP  w/o  trend
0.51  1.84  *  14  SUR  w/ GDP,  from 1980
1.33  2.46  34  Johansen  VECM,  NDT  3
GHANA  0.22  1.62  34  ols w/ (X-M)/GDP  w/o  trend
0.34  4,75  34  ols  w/  AgrlGOP  wlo trend
GREECE  1.46  5.61  34  ols w/o  trend,
0.67  10.75  80  34  ols w/ trend break
0.96  9.09  34  ols w/  GDP
1.01  9.78  34  SUR  w/ GDP,  all available  years
0.68  11.20  34  SUR  w/ trend,  all available  years
0.77  12.57  34  Johansen  VECM,  LOT  5
GRENADA  0.22  01.46  x  9  SUR  w/ trend,  from 1980
GUATEMALA  0.49  3.66  35  ols wlo trend
0.43  1.24  x  35  ols w/ GOP
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5.14  0.93  x  35  Johansen  VECM,  NDT  7
GUINEA-BISSAU  0.05  0.32 * x  8  ols  w/ GDP
0.08  0.46 * x  8  SUR  w/ GDP,  from 1980
0.06  0.37 * x  8  SUR  wI trend,  from 1980
HAITI  0.69  3.80  29  ols w/o  trend
0.62  9.63  29  ols wI GDP
0.64  10.01  29  SUR  w/ GDP,  all available  years
1.62  2.99  29  Johansen  VECM,  NDT  4
HONDURAS  0.29  2.24  35  SUR  w/ GDP,  all available  years
0.28  2.05  35  SUR  wl trend,  all available  years
0.43  1.80  35  Johansen  VECM,  NDT  2
HUNGARY  0.14  1.46  25  ols  w/ (X-M)/GDP  w/o  trend
0.16  1.33 *  x  15  SUR  w/ GDP,  from 1980
0.37  1.70  *  15  SUR  w/ trend,  from 1980
0.04  0.66  x  25  Johansen  VECM,  NDT  2
INDIA  0.29  1.45  75  35  ols w/ trend break
0.16  0.97  x  35  SUR w/ GDP,  all available  years
0.45  2.76 '  15  SURw/ GDP,  from 1980
0.14  0.89  x  35  SUR w/ trend,  all available  years
0.48  2.84 *  15  SUR  w/ trend,  from 1980
INDONESIA  1.39  5.94  28  ols w/o trend
1.32  8.91  28  ols w/ trend
1.26  8.90  28  ols w/ GDP
1.02  8.88  28  SUR  w/ GDP,  all available  years
1.11  8.53  28  SUR  w/ trend,  all available  years
1.14  4.76  28  Johansen  VECM, NDT  4
IRAN;  ISLAMIC  REPUBLIC  OF  0.06  0.71  x  19  SUR  wl trend,  all available  years
IRELAND  1.68  7.63  34  ols w/o trend
0.36  4.67  34  ols w/ trend
0.37  4.76  80  34  ols w/ trend  break
0.43  5.16  -0.17  0.26  80  34  olsw/ elasticity  dummy
0.43  5.31  34  ols w/ GDP
0.52  6.84  34  SUR  wl GOP,  all available  years
0.38  5.02  34  SUR w/ trend,  all available  years
2.95  6.31  34  Johansen  VECM,  LDT  7
0.44  6.08  34  Johansen  VECM,  QDT  1
ISRAEL  0.36  5.02  27  ols w/o trend
0.35  4.81  27  ols w/ trend
0.33  4.32  27  ols w/ GDP
0.34  4.59  27  SUR  w/ GDP,  all available  years
0.35  4.84  27  SUR w/ trend,  all available  years
0.32  6.21  27  Johansen  VECM,  LDT  2
JAMAICA  0.24  1.69  70  34  ols w/ trend break
0.37  1.69  *  14  SUR  w/ GDP,  from 1980
0.24  1.96  34  SUR  wl trend,  all available  years
0.29  2.08 *  14  SUR  wi trend,  from 1980
1.80  2.44  34  Johansen  VECM,  QDT  1
JAPAN  0.14  1.42  0.47  0.61  75  33  ols w/ elasticity  dummy
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0.91  4.81  33  Johansen  VECM,  LDT  I
KENYA  0.88  6.66  31  ols w/ trend
0.94  7.40  80  31  ols w/ trend  break
0.93  5.21  -0.04  0.89  70  31  ols wl elasticity  dummy
0.75  4.04  31  ols  w/ GDP
0.90  5.63  31  SUR  wl GDP,  all available  years
0.79  6.72  31  SUR  wl trend,  all available  years
0.66  2.94  31  Johansen  VECM,  NDT  2
KOREA;  REPUBLIC  OF  0.06  0.29  x  35  SUR  wI trend,  all available  years
0.88  4.30 *  15  SURw/ trend,  from 1980
KUWAIT  1.44  5.48 *  19  olsw/trend
1.31  6.91 *  19  olsw/GDP
1.20  6.48 *  19  SUR  w/ GDP,  all available  years
1.42  5.81 *  19  SUR w/ trend,  all available  years
LAO PEOPLE'S  DEMOCRATIC  REPUB  0.84  5.76 *  10  SUR  w/ trend,  from 1980
LESOTHO  0.55  2.48 *  15  ols w/ GDP
0.48  1.75 *  15  SUR  wI trend,  from 1980
MADAGASCAR  1.08  11.60  34  ols w/o  trend
1.18  6.91  34  ols w/ GOP
0.97  7.51  34  SUR  w/ GDP,  all available  years
1.30  13.1,  34  Johansen  VECM, NDT  3
MALAWI  0.84  8.52  31  ols w/o trend
0.55  3.37  31  ols w/ trend
0.75  5.27  80  31  ols w/ trend  break
0.66  3.55  31  ols w/  GDP
0.66  3.78  31  SUR wl GDP,  all available  years
0.54  3.46  31  SUR  wI trend,  all available  years
0.83  4.64  31  Johansen  VECM,  NDT  6
MALAYSIA  2.14  1.88  25  ols wlo trend
1.66  3.30  25  ols w/ trend
1.78  3.'4  25  ols w/ GDP
0.90  2.74  25  SUR  w/ GDP,  all available  years
1.11  3.20  25  SUR w/ trend,  all available  years
2.37  4.36  25  Johansen  VECM,  LDT  2
MALDIVES  1.38  0.55 *  x  6  SUR w/ trend,  from 1980
MALI  1.06  6.61  25  ols w/o  trend
0.79  3.87  25  ols w/ GDP
0.70  3  49  25  SUR  w/ GOP,  all available  years
1.25  11.40  25  Johansen  VECM, NDT  3
MALTA  2.86  1.43  33  Johansen  VECM, LDT  5
MAURITIUS  0.69  3.92  34  ols w/ trend
0.72  4.03  80  34  ols w/  trend  break
0.67  4.09  34  ols w/ GDP
0.53  3.68  34  SUR w/ GDP,  all available  years
0.61  3.93  34  SUR  w/ trend,  all available  years
2.29  3.60  34  Johansen  VECM,  LDT  6
MEXICO  1.04  4.64  35  ols w/o  trend
0.97  13.51  35  ols w/ trend
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1.07  9.61  85  35  ols wI trend break
1.30  9.59.  -0.70  0.60  85  35  ols wI elasticity  dummy
0.97  5.40  35  ols w/ GDP
1.17  8.01  35  SUR  w/ GDP,  all available  years
1.16  8.95  35  SUR  wl trend,  all available  years
MOROCCO  0.26  1.72  30  ols wlo trend
0.46  2.54  30  ols w/ trend
0.63  3.89  75  30  ols wI trend break
0.46  2.47  30  ols  wl GDP
0.45  2.44  30  SUR w/ GDP,  all available  years
0.44  2.42  30  SUR  w/ trend,  all available  years
MYANMAR  0.26  1.69  28  olsaw (X-M)/GDP  wlo  trend
0.48  5.51  28  ols  w/  (X-M)IGDP  w/ trend
0.83  3.64  15  SUR  wl trend,  from 1980
0.17  2.09  28  Johansen  VECM,  NDT  5
NAMIBIA  0.81  1.91 *  10  olsw/GDP
0.64  1.58  t  10  SURRwltrend,from  1980
NETHERLANDS  1.06  8.11  32  ols wlo trend
2.93  1.65  32  Johansen  VECM,  NDT  1
NIGERIA  0.63  6.59  22  ols w/  trend
0.77  8.04  22  ols w/  GDP
0.76  8.00  22  SUR  w/ GDP,  all available  years
0.64  6.84  22  SUR  wl trend,  all available  years
NORWAY  0.49  5.76  34  ols  w/o trend
0.36  2.36  34  ols w/ trend
0.67  4.82  85  34  ols w/ trend break
0.40  4.13  0.80  1.19  70  34  ols wl elasticrty  dummy
0.33  2.47  34  ols w/  GDP
0.31  2.35  34  SUR  wI GDP,  all available  years
0.32  2.12  34  SUR  wI trend,  all available  years
0.63  5.67  34  Johansen  VECM,  NDT  3
PAKISTAN  OA7  13.69  35  ols w/o  trend
0.49  6.15  35  ols w/  trend
0.61  7.95  70  35  ols w/  trend break
0.43  6.16  35  olsw/GDP
0.43  6.22  35  SUR  w/ GDP,  all available  years
0.92  4.72  15  SUR  wl GDP,  from 1980
0.49  6.14  35  SUR  w/ trend,  all available  years
0.93  4.85 *  15  SUR  w/ trend,  from 1980
0.46  15.03  35  Johansen  VECM,  NDT  1
PANAMA  2.63  1.70 *  7  ols wl GDP
PAPUA  NEW  GUINEA  0.28  1.92  21  ols w/o trend
0.34  2.47  21  ols w/ trend
0.31  2.10  21  als w/ GOP
0.31  2.10  21  SUR  wl GDP,  all available  years
0.34  2.47  21  SUR w/  trend,  all available  years
PARAGUAY  1.37  3.50  35  ols  w/o trend
0.62  2.03  85  35  ols w/  trend  break
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0.93  4.50  35  SUR w/ GDP,  all available  years
0.76  3.81  35  SUR  wl trend,  all available  years
3.19  4.19  35  Johansen  VECM,  NDT  3
PHILIPPINES  0.73  6.31  35  ols w/ trend
0.73  6.37  75  35  ols wI trend break
0.99  6.37  35  ols w/ GDP
1.08  7.97  35  SUR  w/ GDP,  all available  years
0.97  3.03 ^  15  SUR  w/ GDP,  from 1980
0.75  6.85  35  SUR  w/ trend,  all available  years
1.51  2.40 *  15  SUR  wI trend,  from 1980
PORTUGAL  0.63  4.73  27  ols w/o trend
0.61  7.63  27  ols  w/ trend
0.65  7.63  27  ols w/ GDP
0.67  4.47'  27  ols wl  (X-M)/GDP  wto  trend
0.59  6.40  27  ols  wl  (X-M)/GDP  wl trend
0.67  8.75  27  SUR  w/ GDP,  all available  years
0.63  8.38  27  SUR  wI trend,  all available  years
0.41  3.03 *  13  SUR  wltrend, from 1980
0.49  3.93  27  Johansen  VECM,  LDT  3
RWANDA  0.17  1.413  33  ols w/ GDP
0.16  1.44  33  SUR  w/ GDP,  all available  years
0.40  3.95 *  13  SUR  wlGDP, from 1980
0.40  4.09 *  13  SURw/trend, from 1980
0.46  4.91  33  Johansen  VECM,  LDT  4
SALVADOR,  EL  0.40  1.06  x  35  Johansen  VECM,  NDT  6
SENEGAL  0.27  1.34  *  14  ols  w/ GDP
0.27  1.24 * x  14  SUR  wI trend,  all available  years
SEYCHELLES  0.68  2.C9  *  7  olsw/GDP
0.85  2.27 *  7  SUR  w/ trend,  from 1980
SIERRA  LEONE  1.10  7.53  24  ols w/o  trend
0.50  2.49  24  ols w/  trend
0.99  5.94  24  ols wI GDP
1.11  6.93  24  SUR w/ GDP,  all available  years
0.64  3.!54  24  SUR wI trend,  all available  years
SOMALIA  0.82  4.47 *  8  SUR  wl trend,  all available  years
0.82  4.47 *  8  SUR  w/ trend,  from 1980
SOUTH  KOREA  1.64  9.20  35  ols w/o  trend
1.29  5.130  35  ols wi  (X-M)/GDP  wlo trend
SRI LANKA  0.90  4.92  32  ots  w/o trend
0.76  4.15  32  ols w/ trend
1.02  6.92  75  32  ols wI trend  break
0.75  3.96  0.93  1.68  70  32  ols w/  elasticity  dummy
0.66  3.55  32  ols w/ GDP
0.58  3.79  32  SUR  wI GDP,  all available  years
0.62  4 32  32  SUR  w/ trend,  all available  years
3.27  6 58  32  Johansen  VECM,  LDT  3
ST.  KITTS  AND NEVIS  2.80  1.59 *  6  ols wI GDP
2.67  1.41 *  6  SUR  w/ trend,  from 1980
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ST.  VINCENT  AND  THE GRENADINES  1.09  2.30  t  11  ols w/ GDP
0.47  1.38  *  11  SUR  w/ trend,  all available  years
SWAZILAND  0.38  3.23  *  18  olsw/trend
0.38  3.36 *  18  olsw/GDP
0.40  3.57  18  SUR  w/ GDP,  all available  years
0.35  3.02  t  15  SUR  w/ GDP,  from 1980
0.41  3.58  18  SUR w/ trend,  all available  years
SWEDEN  0.41  1.62  34  ols wlo trend
0.17  2.68  70  34  ols w/ trend break
0.14  2.62  34  ols w/ GDP
0.15  2.96  34  SUR  w/ GDP,  all available  years
0.14  2.13  34  SURw/trend, all available  years
1.17  0.67  x  34  Johansen  VECM,  NDT  2
SWITZERLAND  1.38  17.92  34  ols w/o  trend
1.58  19.85  34  ols w/  (X-M)/GDP  w/o  trend
1.61  10.33  34  Johansen  VECM,  NDT  1
SYRIAN  ARAB REPUBLIC  0.12  1.35  17  ols w/ trend
0.09  1.21  * x  17  ols w/GDP
0.11  1.37  *  17  SUR  w/ GDP,  all available  years
0.13  1.54  17  SUR  w/ trend,  all available  years
TAIWAN  1.41  3.50  32  ols w/o  trend
0.18  1.86  1.24  1.41  70  32  ols w/ elasticity  dummy
THAILAND  0.97  4.82  35  ols w/ trend
0.93  5.05  85  35  ols  wl trend  break
0.89  4.88  35  ols w/ GDP
1.13  9.09  35  SUR  w/ GDP,  all available  years
1.07  7.41  35  SUR  w/ trend,  all available  years
TOGO  0.97  3.45 *  18  ols  w/o trend
0.47  1.60  *  18  olsw/trend
0.46  1.93 t  18  SUR  w/ GDP,  all available  years
0.63  2.50 *  8  SUR w/ GDP,  from 1980
0.58  2.22 '  18  SUR  w/ trend,  all available  years
0.77  2.86 *  8  SUR  wI trend,  from 1980
TRINIDAD  AND  TOBAGO  0.81  28.34  28  ols w/o  trend
0.62  7.82  28  ols w/ trend
0.78  24.41  28  ols w/ GDP
0.76  24.34  28  SUR  w/ GDP,  all available  years
0.61  8.35  28  SUR  w/ trend,  all available  years
1.01  10.39  28  Johansen  VECM, NDT  2
TUNISIA  3.14  3.61  27  Johansen  VECM, NDT  6
TURKEY  0.33  1.46  *  8  SURw/trend,from 1980
UNITED  ARAB EMIRATES  0.76  4.32 *  15  SUR  w/ trend,  all available  years
0.71  2.32  10  SURw/trend, from 1980
UNITED  STATES  0.71  2.02  34  ols w/ GDP
0.54  1.57  34  SUR  wl GDP,  all available  years
2.61  7.72  14  SUR  w/ GDP,  from 1980
2.40  0.82  x  34  Johansen  VECM, NDT  4
1.47  0.77  x  34  Johansen  VECM, NDT  5
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VENEZUELA  0.32  1.12 rx  15  SURwl GDP,  from 1980
YUGOSLAVIA  0.64  9.31  21  ols  w/o  trend
0.45  4.95  21  ols  w/  trend
0.53  7.14  21  olsw/GDP
0.55  7.41  21  SUR  wJ  GDP,  all available  years
0.44  4.89  21  SUR  wl trend,  all available  years
ZIMBABWE  0.49  2.87  *  15  ols  wlo  trend
0.51  2.71  15  olsw/trend
0.51  2.75  15  olsw/GDP
0.51  2.72  *  15  SUR  w/  trend,  all  available  years
Notes:
o = Armington  elasticity
t(a)  = t statistic
Model:  Model  Specification
NOB  = Number  of  observations
NDT  - No  deterministic  trend  in the  data,  VECM
LDT  - Linear  deterministic  trend  in  the  data,  VECM
QDT  -Quadratic  deterministic  trend  in  the  data,  VECM
Order:  Number  of  lags  of  the  VECM  model.VECM
SUM  -The  sum  of  elasticity  and  dummy
* = Less  than  20  observations
x = lnsignifcant  at 90%  confidence  level
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ARGENTINA  0.31  1.43  '  10  ols wl  trend
0.37  2.20 *  10  ols w/ GDP
0.39  1.81  *  10  SUR  w/ trend,  from 1980
AUSTRIA  0.78  4.87  30  ols w/ trend
0.94  6.30  75  30  olswl  trend  break
0.98  5.27  0.15  1.13  75  30  ols w/ elasticity  dummy
0.71  4.55  30  SUR w/ trend,  all available  years
0.47  4.42  30  Johansen  VECM, LDT  4
BANGLADESH  0.60  1.94  22  ols w/o trend
0.72  2.55  22  ols w/  (X-M)/GDP  w/o  trend
0.32  1.58  20  ols excl. Agr  exports  w/o trend
BELGIUM  0.39  0.13  x  34  JohansenVECM,  NDT w/Agr/GDP  I
BOLIVIA  0.35  3.04  13  ols w/o  trend
CAMEROON  0.26  1.13  * x  11  SURw/GDP, from 1980
CANADA  1.57  1.19  x  29  JohansenVECM,  NDT  5
CHAD  0.12  0.23'  x  6  SURw/trend, from 1980
CHILE  0.05  0.54  x  15  SUR  w/ trend,  from 1980
CHINA  0.23  4.36  '  15  ols w/o trend
0.21  4.77 *  15  ols wi  (X-M)/GDP  wlo trend
0.15  1.81 *  15  olsw/ Agr/GDPw/o trend
COLOMBIA  0.32  2.01 *  15  SURw/GDP,from 1980
0.52  3.47  15  SUR w/ trend,  from 1980
CONGO  0.95  1.87  30  Johansen  VECM, NDT w/  Agr/GDP  5
COSTA  RICA  0.70  1.55  35  Johansen  VECM, NDT w/ Agr/GDP  I
CYPRUS  0.93  1.26  x  20  ols w/ Agr/GDP  w/  trend
DENMARK  0.03  0.31  x  34  ols w/ trend
0.02  0.32  x  34  ols wI (X-M)lGDP  w/ trend
0.03  0.29  x  34  SUR  wi trend,  all available  years
DOMINICAN  REPUBLIC  2.73  3.95  32  Johansen  VECM, NDT  3
ECUADOR  12.69  3.09  30  Johansen  VECM, NDT  I
EGYPT  0.11  1.72'  13  ols w/o  trend
0.10  1.69 '  13  ols w/ GDP
0.09  1.43 ^  13  SURw/trend, all available  years
FINLAND  0.47  2.72  34  ols w/ trend
0.61  3.36  75  34  ols  w/  trend break
0.32  1.90  34  ols w/ GDP
0.25  1.53  34  SUR  w/ GDP,  all available  years
2.05  3.82 *  14  SUR  w/ GDP,  from 1980
0.43  2.51  34  SUR w/ trend,  all available  years
1.96  6.06 *  14  SURw/trend, from 1980
0.11  0.78  x  34  Johansen  VECM, LDT  4
GHANA  0.10  1.96  34  ols  w/  trend
0.11  2.02  80  34  ols w/  trend  break
0.09  1.72  34  SUR  w/ trend,  all available  years
0.42  4.78  34  Johansen  VECM,  QODT  4
GREECE  0.78  12.63  34  Johansen  VECM,  QODT  5
GUATEMALA  0.33  1.90  85  35  ols w/  trend break
1.70  5.25  35  Johansen  VECM, LDT  2
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HAITI  0.43  3.48  29  ols w/ trend
0.40  3.88  29  ols w/ GDP
0.37  3.62  29  SUR  w/ GDP,  all available  years
0.32  2.74  29  SUR  w/ trend,  all available  years
0.30  3.57  29  Johansen  VECM, LOT  5
0.30  3.55  29  Johansen  VECM,  QDT  5
HONDURAS  0.19  1.14  x  35  JohansenVECM, LDT  4
HUNGARY  0.56  2.59  25  ols wl  (X-M)IGDP  wI trend
INDIA  0.44  5.14  35  ols w/o  trend
0.41  2.32  70  35  ols  w/  trend break
0.45  2.66  35  ols wI GDP
0.43  2.58  35  SUR  w/ GDP,  all available  years
1.02  1.94 *  15  SURwiGDP,from1980
0.33  1.80  35  SUR  w/ trend,  all available  years
0.23  4.81  35  Johansen  VECM, NDT  6
INDONESIA  0.75  1.62  28  Johansen  VECM, NDT w/ Agr/GDP  2
IRAN  0.14  2.03 *  19  olsw/o trend
0.33  1.70  *  19  ols excl. Agr  expors w/o trend
IRELAND  1.01  2.17  28  ols excl. Agr  exports  w/o trend
ISRAEL  0.66  2.55*  15  SUR  w/ GDP,  from 1980
JAMAICA  0.45  3.61  34  ols w/o trend
0.22  1A6  34  olswl trend
0.30  1.94  75  34  ols  w/ trend break
0.29  1.96  34  ols w/ GDP
0.38  2.38  28  ols exd.  Agr exports wlo trend
1.55  3.38  34  Johansen  VECM, NDT  4
1.47  3.46  34  Johansen  VECM, LDT  4
JAPAN  0.56  1.92  33  ols w/  trend
1.06  4.20  80  33  ols w/ trend break
0.90  5.87  33  ols w/ GDP
0.93  4.22  28  ols exd.  Agr  exports  w/  trend
1.04  7.11  33  SURw/GOP, all available  years
0.52  1.84  33  SUR  w/  trend,  all available  years
3.46  2.05  33  Johansen  VECM, NDT  3
2.01  1.33  33  Johansen  VECM, NDT  2
JORDAN  6.10  2.67 *  10  ols  w/ GDP
7.25  2.38 '  10  SUR  wI trend,  all available  years
7.25  2.38 *  10  SUR w/  trend,  from 1980
KOREA;  REPUBLIC  OF  0.94  3.64  35  ols w/ GDP
1.17  2.81  35  SUR w/ trend,  all available  years
KUWAIT  0.45  1.02  * x  9  SUR  wl GDP,  from 1980
MALAYSIA  0.53  1.47  22  ols excl. Agr  exports  w/o trend
2.43  1.68  25  Johansen  VECM, NDT  3
3.24  3.27  25  Johansen  VECM, NOT  5
MALI  3.78  0.77  25  Johansen  VECM,  NDT  3
MALTA  1.71  1.17  33  Johansen  VECM,  NDT  2
MAURITIUS  0.14  0.35 *  14  SUR  w/trend, from 1980
MEXICO  0.42  2.95  85  35  ols wl  trend  break
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0.37  2.09  35  ols w/  Agr/GDP  wl  trend
0.47  2.31  28  ols excl. Agr exports  w/o trend
0.22  1.18  35  SUR  w/ GDP,  all available  years
0.72  4.80 *  15  SUR  w/ GDP,  from 1980
0.76  6.13  t  15  SUR  w/trend, from 1980
2.54  1.49  35  Johansen  VECM, LDT  4
MOROCCO  0.89  3.76  30  Johansen  VECM, NDT w/ Agr/GDP  4
MYANMAR  0.24  0.44  x  28  Johansen  VECM, NDT w/ Agr/GDP  4
NETHERLANDS  0.09  1.81 '  12  SURw/GDP, from 1980
NORWAY  0.27  0.49  x  34  Johansen  VECM, NDT wI Agr/GDP  2
PAKISTAN  1.50  1.43  35  Johansen  VECM, NDT  6
PAPUA  NEW  GUINEA  0.02  0.14 *  x  21  ols wl AgrlGDP  wl  trend
PARAGUAY  1.67  0.97  x  35  Johansen  VECM, NDT w/  Agr/GDP  6
PHILIPPINES  0.23  2.57  35  Johansen  VECM, NDT w/ Agr/GDP  6
PORTUGAL  0.23  2.24  t  13  SUR  w/ GDP,  from 1980
0.20  1.69  t  13  SURwltrend,from 1980
SALVADOR,  EL  0.19  1.88  35  ols w/o  trend
0.23  10.27  35  Johansen  VECM, LDT  6
SENEGAL  0.35  1.63  *  14  ols w/  (X-M)lGDP  w/o  trend
SOUTH  KOREA  1.30  2.36  35  ols w/ trend
1.42  3.36  80  35  ols  wl  trend break
0.54  2.32  35  SUR  w/ GDP,  all available  years
SWEDEN  0.39  5.83  75  34  ols  w/  trend break
0.44  2.04  t  14  SUR  w/ GDP,  from 1980
0.62  5.06 *  14  SUR  w/ trend,  from 1980
0.43  0.21  x  34  Johansen  VECM, NDT  1
SWITZERLAND  0.42  1.22  x  80  34  ols  w/  trend break
0.61  2.92 *  14  SUR  w/trend,  from 1980
SYRIAN  ARAB  REPUBLIC  0.09  1.43  t  17  ols w/o  trend
0.09  1.35  '  17  ols wl  (X-M)/GDP  w/o  trend
TAIWAN  0.60  3.25  32  ols  w/  trend
0.69  4.36  75  32  ols  w/  trend break
0.67  3.35  0.25  0.92  75  32  ols w/ elasticity  dummy
0.17  1.65  32  ols w/ GDP
0.14  1.36  32  SUR  w/  GDP,  all available  years
0.67  4.18  32  SUR  w/ trend,  all available  years
THAILAND  2.89  3.00  35  Johansen  VECM, LDT w/ Agr/GDP  3
TUNISIA  0.31  1.91  27  ols w/o  trend
0.39  2.41  27  olsw/  (X-M)/GDPw/o  trend
TURKEY  0.73  2.91 *  8  ols w/ GOP
0.70  2.61 *  8  SUR  w/ trend,  from 1980
UGANDA  0.08  1.09  t  x  12  ols w/o trend
0.06  1.02  t  x  12  ols w/GDP
0.06  0.94 * x  12  SURw/GDP,from 1980
0.05  0.74 *  x  12  SURw/trend, from 1980
UNITED  STATES  0.39  1.77  34  ols w/ trend
0.49  2.28  80  34  ols w/ trend break
0.39  1.78  34  SUR  w/ trend,  all available  years
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2.77  1.94 *  14  SUR  w/ trend,  from 1980
5.86  2.02  34  Johansen  VECM, NDT  6
VENEZUELA  0.15  1.50*  15  SUR  w/ GDP,  from 1980
0.17  1.68  *  15  SUR  wl trend,  from 1980
Notes:
a = Armington  elasticity
t(o) = t statistic
Model:  Model  Specification
NOB  = Number  of observations
NDT  - No deterministic  trend in the data,  VECM
LDT  - Linear  deterministic  trend  in the data,  VECM
QDT -Quadratic  deterministic  trend in the data,  VECM
Order:  Number  of lags  of the VECM  model.VECM
SUM  -The  sum of elasticity  and dummy
*  =  Less  than  20 observations
x = Insignifcant  at 90%  confidence  level
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